Following the agreement between the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland regarding constitutional reforms, Northern Ireland held a referendum to gain citizens' approval necessary for finalizing the agreement.
Problems and Purpose
Due to its binational and religious divide, Northern Ireland had been suffering from a variety of problems for decades – groups struggling for political power, social inequality, administrative disagreements, and, most significantly, paramilitary insurgencies [1]. With several treaties and declarations not fully solving the issues, the Good Friday talks in 1996 became a way to leave the 'Troubles' behind. [2] When the Agreement was reached on April 10th, 1998, Northern Ireland held a referendum on May 22nd to provide voters the opportunity to approve or reject the Agreement, so as to ensure citizens’ participation and inclusion in the decision [3][4].
Background History and Context
Conflict has existed between Catholic and Protestant communities within Ireland arguably for centuries. In 1920, the island was divided into the British-controlled North, and the independent South [5]. From 1920 to 1972, Northern Ireland’s two-thirds Protestant majority dominated politics, and widespread rights violations of Catholics led to unrest [6]. While the Catholic community largely wanted to reunite with the Catholic majority in the Irish Republic, the Protestant community predominantly supported the union with the UK [7]. The disparity in political representation nurtured the growth of Catholic nationalist parties and increasing hostilities; the late 1960s to early 70s marked the beginning of the period of violence known as the Troubles [8]. In 1972, Britain suspended Northern Ireland’s Parliament and took direct rule over the region [9]. Republicans were outraged at their perceived villianisation by Britain, and violence continued through the 80s and 90s, culminating in over 3,600 fatalities [10].
The UK first acknowledged the legitimate role of the Republic of Ireland with the 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement [11]. Although both sides criticised it, it paved the way to the Downing Street Declaration in 1993, which created a Northern Ireland forum and began cross party talks in 1996 [12]. The 1997 election of Tony Blair led to prioritisation of larger issues such as decommissioning, leading to a full agreement being reached in 1998 [13]. The Agreement introduced changes in both British and Irish legislation systems, creating such democratic institutions as the Northern Ireland Assembly, North-South Ministerial Council and British-Irish Council [14]. Particular attention was given to equality of opportunity, human rights, security, policing and justice, as well as economic, social, and cultural issues [15].
The referendum was influenced by combination of political and paramilitary reasons [16].
Organizing, Supporting, and Funding Entities
The Good Friday Agreement was supported by Sinn Féin, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, and the Ulster Unionist party [17]; the United Kingdom Unionist Party and Democratic Unionist Party opposed the Agreement [18]. All the main parties elsewhere in the UK supported the agreement, and the referendum was organized and funded by the UK government. The `Make it Work’ Fund was established by the active public to help promote the affirmative option of the referendum through advertising, seminars, and participation in public debates. [19]
Participant Recruitment and Selection
All eligible voters in Northern Ireland were invited to vote for or against the adoption of the Belfast Agreement [20]. Awareness was high due to the salience of the issue. For Republican or Irish Nationalist supporters, the Agreement provided an opportunity to constitutionally guarantee a Republican voice within Northern Ireland; Unionist supporters saw the Agreement as maintaining the union with the rest of the UK while also retaining some powers [21].
Methods and Tools Used
The method for this case was a Referendum, one of the most common forms of direct democracy [22]. In Referenda, citizens are invited to vote on a particular issue rather than on representative candidates, and they can be legally binding [23]. There are many types of referenda, such as compulsory referendums — when governments are required to hold a binding popular vote regarding proposed constitutional amendments — or popular referendums, through which citizens can challenge an existing law [24]. The UK does not have legally binding referendums due to Parliamentary sovereignty, so this referendum was officially only advisory — however, there is significant political pressure to abide by the public’s expressed will [25]. Prior to the vote, the media was used to publicise the campaigns, and a copy of the Agreement was sent to all households [26]
What Went On: Process, Interaction, and Participation
Campaign sides were largely divided between those who supported the Agreement (UUP, SDLP, UDP) and unionists mainly dissatisfied with the devolution of power (DUP) [27]. Sinn Féin, though supportive of the Agreement, did not actively campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote, and their counterpart Republican Sinn Féin encouraged voters to reject the Agreement [28].
No public deliberations were held, as the Agreement had already been negotiated. The campaign period was short but busy – the Yes campaign was promoted by Tony Blair and the UUP leader David Trimble, while the DUP leader Ian Paisley was the No campaign’s frontman [29]. US president Clinton “lent his personal weight to the campaign for a “Yes” vote” and together with Blair “appealed to voters to make a new start” [30]. The leaders of UUP and SDLP appeared with U2 “to show unity ahead of the referendum” [31]. By involving high-profile public figures, campaigners hoped to increase interest and confidence in the referendum and the Agreement.
The "Make It Work" Fund generated over £400,000 from various sources - global entrepreneurs, expatriates, and the `Yes’ campaign itself [32]. People collaborated to hold press conferences and release posters and videos, and ad-vans and supporting organizations mobilised to get out the vote [33]. The DUP was the only main party to support the No Campaign [34].
On the day of voting, all participants were asked to vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the question “Do you support the agreement reached in the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland and set out in Command Paper 3883?” [35]. This vote was the mechanism through which participants could make their opinions on the Agreement heard. The process was designed to yield a formal decision on whether or not Northern Ireland would accept the Belfast Agreement, and with 71% of voters in favor of the Agreement, approval to adopt the Agreement was finalized [36]. Results of the referendum were announced to the general public once all votes had been counted.
Influence, Outcomes, and Effects
The referendum was highly successful. Over 71% of people voted Yes, establishing legitimate grounds for implementing the Agreement, fulfilling the intentions of the referendum and leading to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 [37] [38]. The referendum also finally resulted in a drastic reduction of deaths due to sectarian violence [39] as well as guaranteed political rights to both Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland. In the following years, further legislation has passed to add on to it, such as the Hillsborough agreement, the St. Andrews agreement, and the Stormont House agreement [40]. In 2005 the independent decommissioning body confirmed IRA decommissioning had taken place [41]. The result was change in many spheres of Northern Ireland.
Public Policy
The Belfast Agreement can be split roughly into two sections that significantly impacted public policy: The British-Irish agreement and the Multi-party Agreement.
British-Irish Agreement
The British-Irish Agreement required the Northern Irish Assembly, the Republic of Ireland, and the UK government to respect the right of the Northern Irish people to pursue self determination and become part of the Republic of Ireland if they so desired [42]. A majority of persons in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would be required to legitimize unification, and all governments, regardless of the decision made by the Northern Irish people, would be committed to remain fully impartial and respect the cultural, civil and political rights of all citizens [43]. Finally, it also recognised the right of all those born in Northern Ireland to identify as British or Irish and hold both British and Irish citizenship regardless of the status of Northern Ireland [44].
Multi-party Agreement
The multi-party agreement created the Northern Irish Assembly, a devolved governing body elected through Single Transferable Vote with 90 members, with full control over many significant political areas [45][46]. The North South Ministerial Council was also created to discuss problems relevant to the whole of Ireland such as tourism, transport and agriculture [47].
Social Fabric and Individual Attitudes and Behaviors
The establishment of these institutions affected the social fabric of the community in regards to proportionality, self-government, and inclusion of minorities [48]. The introduction of the STV voting system in the Assembly [49], and the creation of bodies responsible for fair employment and equal opportunities [50], contributed to a more proportional and non-discriminatory public sector. The Ministerial Council and additional legal changes, such as the creation of the Bill of Rights, helped to protect the bi-national nature of the region, and equalization of both Irish and British communities.
The transition from violence to peace was not immediate. The early release of political prisoners responsible for terrorist attacks during the Troubles created significant dissatisfaction among unionists [51]. Both sides struggled to accept that past violent rivals were now civil, political opponents with whom they now had to work with in the Assembly. For some time following the Agreement, paramilitary activity continued; one such incident was the Omagh bombing [52], which was executed by the so-called Real IRA, a splinter group from the IRA who opposed the Good Friday Agreement. Some issues, such as the marching rights of Protestant organisations (the Orange Order and the Apprentice Boys), persisted, and led to confrontations [53]. Three children in Drumcree became victims of these discords [54].
Despite the persistence of some issues and conflict, the Agreement and the changes it led to were perceived as a necessary step towards peace and stability in Northern Ireland, and generally is viewed as a positive asset for the ceasefire in the long term. The Agreement significantly reduced military activity — in 1998 there were 55 deaths due to the conflict, whereas in 1999 there were 8. Deaths have never again reached pre-Belfast Agreement numbers [55].
Non-government Institutions
The most significant change for non-governmental institutions was the decommissioning of Unionist and Republican weapons. This happened in the years following the referendum, the most notable being the Provisional Irish Republican Army in 2005 and later Loyalist Volunteer Force in 2006 [56]. This is one example of the referendum’s success in promoting peace in Northern Ireland, as the consent of the people to the Agreement allowed both sides of the conflict to eventually lay down their arms.
Business
The Agreement did not specifically mention business institutions, and none were involved in the planning or implementation of the referendum; however, they benefited from peace following the referendum, which was reflected in the strong positive trend in Northern Ireland’s GDP after the implementation of the Agreement [57]. This is a strong indicator that Northern Irish businesses have fared well due to the results of the referendum.
Shortcomings
While the implementation of the referendum was largely successful, there are a few shortcomings to note. The first is that Protestants were more dissatisfied with the Agreement than Catholics [58]. The second is that many communities voted Yes not due to the specific content of the Agreement, but rather because they either trusted John Hume and David Trimble, or they wanted to end the violence [59]. Ideally voters would read and fully understand issues before they vote on them, and it’s possible that the extreme circumstances pushed voters to approve of the Agreement even if they believed it to be flawed; however, compromise is often necessary in such decisions, and if citizens trust their representatives to help them make decisions on complex issues, this could demonstrate the benefits of mixing representative and direct democracy.
Today, in the political context surrounding Brexit, the preservation of the Good Friday agreement has become a major concern, and violence brought about by tensions over Brexit has led to an increase in paramilitarism [60]. Additionally, power sharing collapsed in 2017, leading to the UK government legislating on certain issues such as abortion rights [61][62].
Analysis and Lessons Learned
Inclusion
Inclusion in the referendum was high. All who were allowed to vote were invited to express their opinion on this very salient issue with serious future implications. Turnout was high at 82% [63] so not only were lots of people able and invited to participate, but lots of people actually did participate; this is good for increasing demographic inclusion, since so much of the population as a whole were involved. Demographic inclusion could have been increased further by the utilization of accessible voting methods, such as a postal vote system or multiple-day voting, which make it easier for those with busy schedules or with limited mobility to participate [64] [65].
The extent of participation is also good for including lots of voices, but as is common with referendums, inclusion in terms of incorporating the voices of the minority into final decisions was not prioritized. Those with the minority ‘no’ opinion were able to make their voices heard, by voting the same as everyone else, but as the minority, they lost, and were disregarded. Practically speaking this is unsurprising — the Agreement and the Troubles were very high-tension issues, and it is unlikely a conclusion could be reached that would please everyone. However, support for the referendum varied significantly between Catholic and Protestant communities. Both communities voted in favor of the Agreement, but at noticeably different margins — one study found that while 99% of Catholics supported the Agreement, only 57% of Protestants supported it [66]. Although this is a majority vote for both groups, the discrepancy raises concerns about sufficient inclusion and consideration of Protestant voices, and highlights the challenges that referendums raise with the ‘winner takes all’ method of decision making.
Popular Control
Viewing the referendum in the wider context of the negotiations and the Belfast Agreement identifies popular control in problem definition, option analysis, and option selection as low, since the referendum was not part of the negotiating process to reach the Agreement, and the negotiating process was not generally open to participation. The referendum itself, however, was part of an implementation phase with high popular control. As the determining factor on whether or not the Agreement would be accepted by Northern Ireland, the referendum — and its participants — exercised a great amount of control over the implementation of the Agreement.
Looking specifically at the structure of the referendum and how it was held, similar results are found. Popular control in problem definition and option analysis were low — participants didn’t get to decide what specifically the referendum would be on, or what the voting options would be. However, they had control over which option (yes or no) they selected. Participants knew the results of the referendum would be implemented, but participants didn’t have control over any specifics of how implementation would happen — an example of this is the periodic suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly due to concerns regarding continued paramilitary activity [67].
The high degree of participation in the referendum is highly supportive of Pateman’s [68] argument for participatory democracy. Pateman challenges Schumpeter’s [69] assumption that citizens are uninterested in participation and incapable of understanding complex issues; the high rate of participation in this referendum strongly supports this challenge.
Considered Judgement
Considered judgement in terms of knowledge was relatively high. All households were sent a copy of the Agreement, so they had easy access to the topic of the referendum [70]. The referendum itself was widely publicized — people knew about it, and they knew the stances of different political parties, most of whom supported the Agreement [71]. The domination of the Yes campaign could have impacted considered judgment in terms of empathy, if there was little awareness for why ‘no’ voters didn’t support the Agreement — particularly considering how important the issue was.
Referendums are typically characterized by increased popular control as a trade for lower considered judgement [72]. In this case, the use of the referendum in conjunction with government negotiations could have changed these typical dynamics. Considering the complicated and volatile nature of the conflict, the fact that the negotiations for the Agreement were not open to everyone could have actually increased considered judgment, by working to keep conflict low and knowledge high. The referendum allowed for high popular control in implementation. In this way, the mixed design attempts a balance between these democratic goods.
Transparency
Internal and External Transparency were both very high. Awareness of the referendum and the Agreement was high, due to the salience and the importance of the issue, and voters knew that the outcome of the vote would determine Northern Ireland’s acceptance of the Agreement.
Efficiency
As is typical for referendums, institutional efficiency was relatively low due to the cost, but individual efficiency was rather high, since participants were only required to cast a single vote on one day. Very little was demanded of participants. Efficiency, like inclusion, could have been improved by accessible voting methods, but it was already quite high.
Transferability
The particular success of this referendum could be difficult to replicate in situations that lack similar contexts. The Belfast Agreement was a very high-profile issue in Northern Ireland, and this salience was intertwined with the specific political and social contexts of Ireland — notably, the conflict between Unionists and Republicans, and Protestants and Catholics. The prior conflict contributed significantly to the salience of the Agreement, which in turn almost certainly contributed to the high degree of participation in the Referendum. Those factors can’t be faked in referendums in different contexts, so in that regard transferability is low.
Achieving all the democratic goods to the fullest extent poses a consistent challenge. This referendum achieved a balance of democratic goods, largely due to its context. Considering this success, it is a valuable example of democratic participation and the efficacy of direct democracy.
See Also
https://participedia.net/method/4912
References
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